

bodies. With the cooperation of city agencies, schools and volunteer groups (she calls her own role "coalition-building"), more than a dozen playgrounds were made safer. Metal swings—which too often smashed into children, sometimes fracturing skulls—were replaced by soft rubber ones. Broken climbing bars with jagged points also were replaced. Pocked asphalt, which so easily tripped dashing feet, yielded to rubberized surfaces. Graffiti-strewn walls were painted over with cheerful murals by schoolchildren. Five entirely new playgrounds with Harlem motifs were created.

Dr. Barlow didn't stop there. When a child was raped in the darkness of unkempt Jackie Robinson Park in northern Harlem, where the lights had long been out, she demanded that city officials get the lights back on. Now, Little League teams once again play on the park's renovated fields, and two of the teams are sponsored by Harlem Hospital.

While sports have their place, they can't give a child what gardening can, according to Bernadette Cozart, a gardener for the city parks department. Her "Greening of Harlem" project works in cooperation with the Injury Prevention Program. Under Cozart's eye, children fill vacant lots and playground plots with flowers and vegetables. Typical is the garden at P.S. 197, an elementary school. Roses, lilies, tomatoes, eggplants, even collard greens thrive there. "I have kids who wouldn't eat anything green until they started growing it," said Cozart.

Like gardening, the hospital's popular dance program might seem far afield from injury prevention. But time spent dancing is time away from the mean streets of the inner city. "Why shouldn't these children be loaded up with afterschool activities, just like suburban children are?" asked Dr. Barlow.

No Harlem child, however, can avoid the streets: 48 percent of pediatric trauma injuries at Harlem Hospital involve motor vehicles. So "Safety City," a course for third-graders on how to be a safe pedestrian, is part of the Injury Prevention Program (aided by the city's department of transportation). Another part of the program is the Urban Youth Bike Corps, which provides helmets and bicycle-repair instruction, while the KISS (Kids, Injuries and Street Smarts) project educates teens about gun violence.

So varied has the Injury Prevention Program become that it's easy to assume Dr. Barlow has little time left for old-fashioned doctoring. That would be a mistake. She still takes a turn of duty every fourth night, though, as a department chief, she doesn't have to.

Dr. Barlow's pioneering program is now going national, thanks to a new \$1.1 million grant from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. Pittsburgh, Chicago and Kansas City, Mo., are the first cities to replicate it. At Harlem Hospital, meanwhile, the surest sign of the continuing downward trend in trauma injuries is a dark corner of the pediatric ward. "We used to have patients hanging off the rafters when I first came here," said Dr. Barlow. "Now I've closed off six beds. We don't need them anymore."

#### SOCIAL SECURITY COURT OF APPEALS ACT OF 1995

**HON. ANDREW JACOBS, JR.**

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Tuesday, May 9, 1995*

Mr. JACOBS. Mr. Speaker, I am today introducing the Social Security Court of Appeals

Act of 1995 which creates a court to adjudicate appeals from Federal district court related to Social Security. A summary prepared by the minority staff of the Subcommittee on Social Security follows:

The past decade has witnessed increasing regional variation in the standards of eligibility used by the Social Security Administration [SSA] to evaluate applications for disability benefits. A significant cause of this variation is the Federal courts' increased role in reviewing SSA decisions and interpreting agency regulations. Court intervention has been, and continues to be, vitally important in protecting the right of claimants. However, the regional nature of court jurisdiction can also serve to fragment Social Security disability standards along geographic lines and result in disparities in treatment of similarly situated claimants.

To address this problem, this legislation would establish a single, national Social Security Court of Appeals. This court would be modeled after the court of appeals for the Federal circuit, which has jurisdiction over patent and trademark law, international trade, and the Court of Claims. The new court would replace the 12 Federal circuit courts of appeal in adjudicating Social Security and Supplemental Security Income [SSI] benefit appeals from Federal district courts. The court would consist of five judges with lifetime appointments. It would render appeal decisions in panels of three judges, as is the case at present with Federal circuit courts of appeal. The new court would be located in Washington, DC, but would have authority to travel as it deemed necessary. As the single body to adjudicate Social Security and SSI appeals from Federal district courts, this court would be positioned to articulate a consistent body of case law and to eliminate regional discrepancies in SSA policy.

Claimants' rights to appeal SSA decisions to Federal district courts would be unaffected by this legislation. Moreover, decisions of the Social Security Court of Appeals would be appealable to the U.S. Supreme Court, just as Social Security decisions by the circuit courts of appeal are under current law.

DOD INCREMENTAL COSse member.TS IN SUPPORT OF U.N. PEACEKEEPING

**HON. LEE H. HAMILTON**

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Tuesday, May 9, 1995*

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, many members have expressed interest in the scope and nature of incremental costs incurred by the Department of Defense in support of peacekeeping operations conducted or authorized by the United Nations. This issue was the subject of some confusion during the debate in the House on H.R. 7, the National Security Revitalization Act.

On January 13, I wrote to Secretary of Defense William Perry requesting detailed information on these costs. On February 15, I received an interim response from Under Secretary of Defense Walter Slocombe, followed by further clarification in a letter from Under Secretary Slocombe on April 18.

The Department of Defense now estimates its voluntary incremental costs in support of

nonassessed U.N. peacekeeping operations at \$1.41 billion in fiscal year 1994. As Under Secretary Slocombe points out in his latest letter:

Were the United States to credit amounts of this size against our annual U.N. peacekeeping assessment, it would cancel out our entire yearly contribution, thereby seriously impairing the U.N.'s capability to conduct peacekeeping operations.

Because these are now the latest official Department of Defense estimates of these costs, I ask that this correspondence be included in the RECORD.

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

*Washington, DC, January 13, 1995.*

Hon. WILLIAM J. PERRY,  
Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense,  
The Pentagon, Washington, DC.

DEAR SECRETARY PERRY: I write concerning the Committee on International Relations impending markup of H.R. 7, the foreign affairs portion of the "Contract with America", and information we need prior to that markup in order to defend the Administration's position.

Two provisions in H.R. 7, if enacted as currently drafted, would cripple the ability of the United States to support U.N. peacekeeping operations, and might well shut down such operations altogether. Sections 501 and 508 of that legislation, taken together, would prohibit effectively the ability of the Defense Department to support U.N. peacekeeping operations, and off-set any DOD support for U.N. authorized actions against the U.S. peacekeeping assessment to the U.N.

I believe that these provisions stem from a political perception that DOD participation in or support for U.N. peacekeeping operations and related activities has had a negative impact on U.S. military readiness. While I anticipate a lengthy debate this year in Congress on the subject of U.S. military readiness generally, my problem is that we in Congress do not have the necessary information to have an informed debate on whether and how DOD support for U.N. peacekeeping operations might contribute to the readiness issue.

I therefore would urge you to provide at your earliest possible convenience the following information:

How does DOD differentiate between direct and indirect support for "Contingency Operations", and for direct and indirect support for U.N. peacekeeping operations?

What costs has DOD incurred in Fiscal Year 1994 for contingency operations for U.N. authorized operations, such as the no-fly zone in Iraq? For "Blue Helmet" operations such as UNSOM II?

How much was DOD reimbursed by the U.N. in Fiscal Year 94 for support of U.N. peacekeeping operations? In each case, at what time were DOD costs incurred, on what date did DOD request each such reimbursement, and when did each such U.N. reimbursement occur?

How much of these costs in Fiscal Year 1994 have been covered by U.S. supplemental appropriations? In cases where supplemental appropriations have been provided and the U.N. has subsequently reimbursed those costs, how much has DOD returned to the U.S. Treasury?

Who within DOD compiles information on incremental costs associated with U.N. peacekeeping operations? Is it done by each service, then collated by the Office of the Secretary of Defense? Or some other way?

I look forward to your prompt response.

With best regards,  
Sincerely,

LEE H. HAMILTON,  
*Ranking Democratic Member.*

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,  
Washington, DC, February 15, 1995.

Hon. LEE H. HAMILTON,  
*Ranking Democrat, Committee on International  
Relations, House of Representatives, Wash-  
ington, DC.*

DEAR CONGRESSMAN: Secretary Perry asked me to respond to your letter of January 13 about the effect of HR-7 on the ability of the United States to support UN peacekeeping activities. The provisions of the "Contract with America" embodied in HR-7 that address this issue could certainly significantly reduce the funding available to the United Nations for these efforts, especially if the U.S. position becomes the model for all nations to use. Let me discuss my concerns with three particular sections of the bill.

Section 501 would require that we deduct from our UN peacekeeping assessment the "costs of United States support for, or participation in, United Nations Peacekeeping activities for that preceding fiscal year." We oppose this. If this provision is broadly interpreted and recent experience is a guide, requiring the United States to deduct these costs from our peacekeeping assessment would end all U.S. assessment payments to UN peace operations—in violation of our commitment under the UN charter—or force us to cease those military activities which we voluntarily undertake to support UN operations when they serve our national security interests.

Further, this section would invite chaos in the United Nations financial system by prompting member states to adopt our unilateral policy. For example, other NATO states may seek credit for costs incurred in enforcing the Bosnia and Iraq no-fly zones; Japan might seek reimbursement for the fund it established to underwrite the logistics costs in Somalia or for its large voluntary contributions to the United Nations peace operation in Cambodia.

The Department also takes strong exception to Section 507, which would prohibit the United States from paying UN peacekeeping assessments until we are reimbursed for all prior-year assistance to the United Nations. The fact is, the United States already receives preferential treatment in being reimbursed promptly. Nevertheless, the process is sufficiently complex and time consuming that reimbursement takes some months to complete. In addition, any delays are due in part to the fact that many member states, including the United States, are perennially behind in paying their peacekeeping assessments to the United Nations.

Section 508 would prohibit the Department from paying incremental costs associated with participation in United Nations peace operations unless Congress has specifically appropriated funds for this purpose. This Section is an unacceptable infringement on the President's constitutional authority and could spell the end of many important U.S. operations. This provision would bar the President from deploying forces or otherwise supporting peace operations unless Congress first authorizes such operations. For example, this prohibition would have delayed the time sensitive Desert Shield/Desert Storm actions ordered by President Bush, thereby jeopardizing the success of this model of coordinated international efforts undertaken to sustain world order.

The effect of participation in United Nations peace operations on the readiness of our armed forces has been a much discussed topic. This should not be an issue. As you are aware, the Secretary of Defense has made

readiness a top priority. The readiness of our military forces has clearly been demonstrated through superb performance in a wide range of contingency operations. Overall, the readiness ratings of our units remain at very high levels and the Secretary is committed to devoting the necessary resources to see our forces remain ready. Next year, in fact, our readiness funding per capita remains high, and in November 1994, the Secretary announced a \$2.7 billion quality of life initiative tailored to ensure we sustain our well-trained military personnel.

We all know that peace operations are not a substitute for vigorous alliances or strong unilateral U.S. action when it is necessary to protect our vital interests. However, well-planned and well-managed United Nations peace operations have a demonstrated capacity to effectively protect and advance U.S. security and humanitarian interests. We do ourselves a disservice as a nation if in the process of identifying and taking steps to redress the shortcomings of United Nations peace operations, we disregard or disparage the concrete U.S. interests advanced by the more than 60,000 United Nations troops—98 percent of them non-American—serving in seventeen peace operations around the globe. For example, in the Persian Gulf, a 1,200 person observer mission—which includes 15 Americans—monitors Iraqi troop movements along the Iraq-Kuwait border, demonstrating the international community's continued resolve to contain Saddam Hussein's expansionist ambitions. Another longer term effort has been the UN presence in Cyprus, where 1,200 UN troops—all non-American—have successfully prevented a flareup of violence between two key NATO allies.

The enclosed fact sheet responds to each of your questions on FY 1994 funding and reimbursement for contingency operations, as well as providing information on how the Department compiles relevant cost data. I trust that the information provided advances informed congressional debate on this issue.

WALTER B. SLOCOMBE.

#### RESPONSES TO REPRESENTATIVE HAMILTON'S QUESTIONS

(1. How does DoD differentiate between direct and indirect support for "Contingency Operations," and for direct and indirect support for UN peacekeeping operations?)

The Department incurs costs associated with a wide range of unplanned "contingency operations." Many, but not all of these operations, are authorized by the United Nations. UN peace operations are among these UN-authorized activities.

U.S. involvement in UN related operations falls into three different categories.

(1) U.S. Participation in UN Peace Operations. A small number of U.S. troops participate in UN mandated and assessed "blue-helmeted" operations. These include some 800 U.S. military personnel serving with UNPROFOR contingents in Croatia and Macedonia and the more than 2,000 U.S. troops that served in UNOSOM II in 1993 and 1994.

(2) Support to UN Peace Operations. DoD provides various forms of support on a reimbursable basis to UN blue-helmeted peace operations under the authorities of Section 607 of the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act. This support takes the form, for example, of military services to move troops or equipment to and from UN peace operations and the lease or sale of various types of equipment for such operations.

(3) U.S. Participation in Operations Authorized by the UN. Other U.S. troops participate in several operations that are authorized by the UN, often at the request of the United States as a means to gain wider international participation and support. Some of these operations are carried out in close coordination with and in the vicinity of

ongoing UN peace operations. Examples include U.S. forces involved in conducting the Deny Flight operation over Croatia and Bosnia, sanctions enforcement directed against Iraq and several states of the former Yugoslavia, and the Multinational Force operation in Haiti. Also included in this category is support to UN peace operations for which the U.S. is not reimbursed (e.g., transportation support in Angola).

The Department does not differentiate between U.S. direct and indirect support for contingency operations in general, nor for UN peace operations in particular. Incremental costs are calculated for all contingency operations, including those operations identified as UN related.

Pending clarification of the definitions contained in H.R. 7, the Department has not determined which of the above types of operations and the costs associated with them should be considered "direct" and "indirect" support of UN peace operations.

(2. What costs has DoD incurred in Fiscal Year 1994 for contingency operations for UN authorized operations, such as the no-fly zone in Iraq? for "Blue Helmet" operations such as UNOSOM II?)

The table below provides FY 1994 incremental costs for each of the UN authorized operations. (Note that total incremental costs incurred by DoD for all contingency operations in FY 1994 were in excess of \$1.9 billion, including responses to increased tensions in Korea, and support to pick up and process the Cuban migrants in Guantanamo and Panama as well as many UN authorized operations.)

#### Fiscal year 1994 U.N.-related operations DOD incremental costs<sup>1</sup>

[In millions of dollars]

U.S. Participation in Peace Operations:	
Former Yugoslavia (Macedonia) ..	3.0
Somalia <sup>2</sup> .....	528.0
Support to UN Peace Operations:	
Cambodia .....	5.0
Rwanda (UN requested airlift) .....	10.8
U.S. Participation in Operations Authorized by the UN:	
Angola .....	2.6
Former Yugoslavia (Bosnia/Croatia) .....	289.0
Haiti (Interdiction/Sanctions) .....	65.8
Haiti (Uphold Democracy) .....	200.8
Iraq (Provide Comfort) .....	91.8
Iraq (Southern Watch) .....	333.0
Rwanda .....	95.9
Western Sahara .....	.1
Total .....	1,625.8

<sup>1</sup>Excludes costs of longstanding UN Operations such as Korea and the Multinational Observer Force in the Sinai.

<sup>2</sup>Includes both the U.S. troops participating in the UN operation and the Quick Reaction Force operating in support of this effort as these costs cannot be differentiated.

(3. How much was DoD reimbursed by the UN in Fiscal Year 1994 for support of UN peacekeeping operations? In each case, at what time were DoD costs incurred, on what date did DoD request each such reimbursement, and when did each such UN reimbursement occur?)

During FY 1994, the Department received \$95.9 million in reimbursements from the UN for goods and services provided to and personnel participation in UN peace operations. Most of the reimbursements (\$92.8 million) were for Somalia. Of these, \$11.5 million was for costs incurred in FY 1994, with the balance related to FY 1993 costs. At the minimum, it takes 90 days for the DoD to forward a bill to the United Nations, and 60 days for the United Nations to complete reimbursement.

4. How much of these costs in Fiscal Year 1994 have been covered by U.S. supplemental appropriations? In cases where supplemental appropriations have been provided and the UN has subsequently reimbursed those costs, how much has the DoD returned to the U.S. Treasury?)

The information follows:

#### FISCAL YEAR 1994 UN-RELATED OPERATIONS

(In millions of dollars)

	Incremental costs	Covered by supplemental
U.S. Participation in Peace Operations:		
Former Yugoslavia (Macedonia) .....	3.0	3.0
Somalia .....	528.0	424.1
Support to U.N. Peace Operations:		
Cambodia .....	5.0	
Rwanda (U.N. requested Airlift) .....	10.8	
U.S. Participation in Operations Authorized by the U.N.:		
Angola .....	2.6	
Former Yugoslavia (Bosnia) .....	289.0	273.7
Haiti (Interdiction/Sanctions) .....	65.8	50.0
Haiti (Uphold Democracy) .....	200.8	( <sup>1</sup> )
Iraq (Provide Comfort) .....	91.8	92.0
Iraq (Southern Watch) .....	333.0	332.5
Rwanda (Unilateral Support) .....	95.9	122.2
Western Sahara .....	.1	
Total .....	1,625.8	1,297.5

<sup>1</sup> The Secretary of Defense used the Feed and Forage authority to cover \$126.3 million of the costs incurred in this effort. The appropriations to cover these costs are requested in the FY 1995 Emergency Supplemental.

Note: The Department returned to the Treasury all reimbursements for costs already funded through supplemental appropriations. For FY 1994, the total amount was \$25 million, of which \$22 million was associated with UNOSOM II (Somalia) and the balance related to UNPROFOR (Former Yugoslavia).

5. Who within DoD compiles information on incremental costs associated with UN peacekeeping operations? Is it done by each Service, then collated by the Office of the Secretary of Defense? Or some other way?)

The DoD Components determine the incremental costs for contingency operations in which each is involved. They report these costs to the Department of the Army, which as Executive Agent for these efforts prepares a consolidated report for all operations. The DoD is in the process of transferring the reporting responsibility to the Defense Finance and Accounting Service, an organization that has the basic mission of providing this type of service to the Department.

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,  
Washington, DC, April 18, 1995.

Hon. LEE HAMILTON,  
Ranking Democrat, Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN: As I indicated in our 15 February response to your January 13 letter regarding the impact of H.R. 7 on the ability of the United States to support UN peacekeeping activities, we initiated another examination of the fiscal year 1994 costs associated with contingency operations. In particular, we wanted to provide you a more specific breakout of the costs associated with contingency operations related to United Nations Security Council resolutions, where possible. The attached information provides the best data available.

At the time that some of these UN-related operations commenced, we did not foresee the requirement to account for costs according to the authority under which U.S. forces participated, and therefore, did not require the Services or Defense Agencies to collect data at the level of detail requested in your letter. We have since remedied this through new financial procedures directed by the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). In the interim, working with the Services and the Office of Management and Budget, we have been able to use existing information to develop a better estimate of the costs for

certain operations. I stress, however, that the attached figures are our "best estimate" of the incremental costs since we did not require the Services and Defense Agencies to capture these precise data.

The most important point about this information is that it indicates that crediting the incremental expenditures associated with our voluntary participation in these UN-related operations would, at a minimum, reduce significantly the USG's payment of United Nations peacekeeping assessments if DoD's incremental costs were credited against the USG's assessment. The United States spent \$1.4 billion in fiscal year 1994 on operations voluntarily undertaken in connection with UN Security Council resolutions. Were the United States to credit amounts of this size against our annual UN peacekeeping assessment, it would cancel out our entire yearly contribution, thereby seriously impairing the UN's capability to conduct peacekeeping operations.

I hope the following provides you with useful information and is of value during any further debate of this issue in the Congress.

Sincerely yours,

Walter B. Slocombe.

#### INCREMENTAL COSTS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1994 "NON-BLUE HELMET" BUT UN-RELATED OPERATIONS<sup>1</sup>

Operation	Cost (million)	UNSCR
Former Yugoslavia <sup>2</sup> .....	\$289	
Sanctions Enforcement (Sharp Guard) .....	(75)	787
Humanitarian Airdrop (Provide Promise) .....	(77)	770
No-Fly Zone (Bery Flight) .....	(85)	781, 816, 836
Other Costs .....	(52)	
Haiti:		
Multinational Force (Uphold Democracy) .....	197	940
Sanctions Enforcement (Support Democracy) .....	65	841
Southwest Asia:		
Sanctions Enforcement/No-Fly Zone-S. Iraq (Southern Watch) .....	333	687
No-Fly Zone/Kurdish Relief-N. Iraq (Provide Comfort) .....	92	688
Somalia (non-UNOSOM II) <sup>3</sup> .....	434	794
Total .....	1,410	

<sup>1</sup> For the purposes of this analysis, the operations were limited to those carried out in relation to a UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) but not including UN mandated and assessed "blue helmet" peace operations.

<sup>2</sup> Estimates based on reports from the Services. The category titled "Other Costs" includes costs that are not attributable to the "blue-helmet" UNPROFOR operation, but are related to the other three operations in the former Yugoslavia. Further, these costs could not be allocated accurately to a specific DoD component. All other costs were related directly to a Military Department.

<sup>3</sup> Estimate based on reports from the Services.

#### IN RECOGNITION OF THE FROMM INSTITUTE FOR LIFELONG LEARNING

##### HON. NANCY PELOSI

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, May 9, 1995

Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in recognition of the University of San Francisco's Fromm Institute for Lifelong Learning, which celebrates its 20th anniversary on May 6, 1995.

Alfred and Hanna Fromm are a living example of the American dream. As a married couple fleeing Hitler's Germany in the 1930's, they came to this country as refugees, and reaped the rewards of their hard work. Alfred was instrumental in reviving a dormant wine industry in California following Prohibition, using his talents to transform Christian Brothers, and then Paul Masson, into world-renowned labels of wine. His distributorship, Fromm & Sichel, became the largest distributor of California wines in the world.

Alfred and Hanna have never forgotten the needs of their community. They have involved

themselves deeply and generously in the civic and cultural life of San Francisco. They are cofounders of the Jewish Community Museum, and have served on the boards and supported organizations as diverse as the opera and Amnesty International. Their dedicated service to the San Francisco community and the Nation is a model and inspiration for all.

In 1976, Hanna and Alfred recognized the need to expand and enhance the then severely limited educational opportunities and options available to senior San Franciscans living in retirement. Together, they set to work to provide a suitable setting where retired members of the community could pursue serious academic study among their peers and under the tutelage of their peers, but with the resources of a modern great urban university at their disposal.

Thus was born the Fromm Institute for Lifelong Learning. Thousands of seniors have enrolled in this "university within a university," presenting 8-week, noncredit, academic courses three times a year. Courses span the disciplines of psychology, literature, philosophy, science, theology, history, art, music, politics, and creative writing.

Mr. Speaker, Hanna and Alfred have received recognition and commendations from Presidents, Governors, and mayors. Yet, their deepest satisfaction comes from seeing their peers who enter the halls of the Fromm Institute for Lifelong Learning and continue the journey of learning through their retirement years. That may be the best and greatest legacy of these two extraordinary people, and on behalf of the Congress, let us join the entire San Francisco community in thanking Alfred and Hanna Fromm on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Fromm Institute for Lifelong Learning.

CAPT. RANDOLPH L. GUZMAN

##### HON. BILL BAKER

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, May 9, 1995

Mr. BAKER of California. Mr. Speaker, the entire Nation continues to mourn the tragedy in Oklahoma City. This cowardly and vicious act was an assault on our country, a wanton act of political terrorism and social destruction.

It was also an act in which dozens of individual lives were brutally ended. From small children to senior Federal employees, we have witnessed the heartbreaking spectacle of battered bodies carried out of the Murrah Federal Building, one by one.

One of these bodies was covered with an American flag. It was that of Marine Capt. Randolph L. Guzman, a native of Castro Valley, CA, a city in the East Bay area I am privileged to represent in Congress.

Captain Guzman was the recruiting station executive officer in the Murrah Building. A marine since 1983, he was a graduate of California State University at Hayward and was commissioned a second lieutenant in 1988.

A participant in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, his service included tours in Virginia, Hawaii, Japan, and finally in Oklahoma. Among his many decorations are the Navy